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Background: Previous studies have investigated factors that are influential on the choice of training hospitals
among residency physicians, but the effect of salary was not conclusive. In this study, we aimed to examine
whether a higher salary attracted more residents to non-university hospitals participating in the Japanese Residency
Matching Programme.
Methods: Data on 475 hospitals/programmes between 2006 and 2009 were available for analysis. We first
conducted an ordinary least squares regression analysis on the ratio of the number of applicants to the residency
programme quota as an index of resident’s choice, for comparison with previous studies. We further performed
panel data analysis to better control for unobserved heterogeneity across hospitals, which could be confounded by
the amount of salary. We also performed stratified analysis by the population size of the hospital location.
Results: In ordinary least squares regression, salary showed a positive, but not significant association, with the ratio
of the number of applicants to the programme quota, while the results of a fixed effect model exhibited a positive
and significant effect of salary (ε= 0.4995, P = 0.015) on the ratio. Analysis stratified by city size showed that the
elasticity of salary was comparable (ε= 1.9089, P = 0.016 in large cities versus ε= 1.9185, P = 0.008 in small cities),
while that of the number of teaching physicians was larger in large cities (ε= 1.9857, P = 0.009) compared with that
in small cities (ε= 1.6253, P = 0.033). The number of teaching physicians had a significant and negative effect
modification on salary, implying an antagonistic effect between these two attributes (ε= −1.5223, P = 0.038).
Conclusions: Our results indicate that the amount of salary influences the choice of training hospitals among
medical graduates who choose non-university settings. Use of a monetary reward in a residency programme could
be a feasible tactic for hospitals to attract residents.
Keywords: Residency programme, Economic incentive, Matching programme, JapanBackground
The mal-distribution of physicians is a common problem
not only in developed countries, but also in middle in-
come and developing countries [1-9]. Possible political
solutions to expand physicians to underserved areas are
much discussed, such as increasing the supply of physi-
cians, reforming career selection and professional train-
ing system, compulsory duties, and preparing incentives
to serve in underserved areas [10]. Several studies have* Correspondence: hidehashimoto-circ@umin.ac.jp
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumshown that increasing the supply of physicians falls short
of a solution to the problem, but rather exacerbates the
unequal distribution of physicians [2,10-12]. Instead, fi-
nancial incentives have been regarded as more effec-
tive strategies to attract physicians in underserved areas,
though they may not solve the whole issue of mal-
distribution of the physicians [6,10,13-15].
Many studies have demonstrated that monetary incen-
tives are influential on a physician’s career choice of subspe-
cialties, such as paediatrics [16], emergency medicine [17],
internal medicine [18,19], surgery [20], primary care
[21,22], and being a general practitioner [23]. A previous
study in the USA showed that the effect of concerns onCentral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited.
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choice among new medical school graduates [24]. In Japan,
Kawamura [25] performed one of the first studies to empir-
ically assess influential factors of residency choice among
new graduates. Using a multivariable regression model, this
previous study concluded that salary was a significantly in-
fluential factor among those who chose university hospitals,
while non-economic factors, such as the number of super-
vising doctors, were influential among those who chose
non-university hospitals.
However, it is premature to conclude from Kawamura’s
study [25] that the effect of payment conditions for resi-
dency choice is limited to those residents in university hos-
pitals. In fact, according to Kawamura, the salary for 2
years in university hospitals was 6 478 000 yen ($80 975 at
the exchange rate of 1 USD = 80 JPY) on average, com-
pared with 9 115 000 yen ($113 938) in non-university hos-
pitals [25]. Lower salaries in university hospitals were often
attributed to authoritarian influence by clinical departments
in medical schools on young trainees’ future career paths in
affiliated hospitals [26]. Therefore, it is possible that a
young graduate’s choice of non-university hospitals in his/
her early career is already affected by incentives other than
authoritative reasons, including economic incentives related
to annual salary.
According to a questionnaire survey conducted by the
Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare (MHLW), 27.1%
of residents who chose non-university hospitals answered
that salary and work environment affected their choice of
training hospitals [27]. Nomura et al. also conducted a
questionnaire survey among second-year residents, and
reported that those who chose non-university hospitals
were more satisfied with a higher income [28].
A wide variation in the annual salary, even among non-
university hospitals, has been reported, with five- to six-fold
difference between the top and bottom salaries [29]. The
amount of salary is determined endogenously based on
conditions in hospitals, such as location, university affili-
ation, teaching status, and size. Therefore, the effect of in-
come on specialty choice might have been underestimated
in previous studies because the amount of salary was
treated as an exogenous variable. Hay showed that a signifi-
cant effect of income on the choice of specialty was ob-
served only when the simultaneously determined supply
and demand of the specialty were counted by using a two-
staged logit-ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator [30].
The objective of the current study was to identify
whether the improved payment conditions affected a med-
ical graduate’s choice of residency programme in Japan. We
re-investigated the effect of annual salary on the hospital
choice of medical graduates using a different approach.
First, we limited our analysis to non-university hospitals be-
cause the distribution of salaries is different between uni-
versity and non-university hospitals. In fact, salaries paid inuniversity hospitals are homogenous across institutes be-
cause of regulatory reasons due to the governmental sub-
sidy. The salaries in university hospitals have also been
almost constant over time since the introduction of the
new residency programme as is described shortly [31]. Fur-
thermore, the choice of university hospitals is supposedly
influenced by a distinctive set of individual preferences,
such as a preference for an academic career path and for
home location [27]. Because data on individual preferences
were not available, exclusion of university hospitals from
our study sample was necessary to discriminate the effect
of salary and distinctive sets of individual preferences. Add-
itionally, because university hospitals often change their
quota for residents according to the expected number of
applicants, the ratio of the number of applicants to the
quota, which was our target variable, is endogenously deter-
mined, and does not necessarily reflect residents’ prefer-
ences in the case of university hospitals.
Second, we introduced panel data analysis to control for
unobserved heterogeneity across hospitals that could be re-
lated to a hospital’s decision on the amount of salary.
Therefore, we hoped to overcome any bias caused by an
endogenously determined annual salary, and by controlling
this, we aimed to determine the actual effect of salary on a
new graduate’s choice of residency programme [32].Methods
New Residency Matching Programme in Japan
In 2004, the Japanese government introduced a new Post-
graduate Medical Education Programme (PGME) to im-
prove physicians’ skills in general medicine. Before 2004,
medical graduates tended to seek residency positions in
university hospitals affiliated with their own graduate me-
dical schools, where the residency programme was not
standardized and was often limited to subspecialty trai-
ning [33]. Since the introduction of PGME, all medi-
cal graduates are obliged to take the 2-year standardized
residency programme. In addition, a nationwide computer-
based residency matching system called the Japan Resi-
dency Matching Programme (JRMP) started to offer
medical graduates a broader range of choices, includ-
ing community hospitals with new residency programmes
[34,35]. Because the number of resident positions excee-
ded the number of annual medical graduates, hospitals
competed with each other to attract new medical gradu-
ates through appealing to the excellence of the training
programme, resulting in a considerable shift of residents
from university to non-university hospitals [28,36].
Another change since this reform was the payment
conditions of residents. The annual salary of residents
was raised, on average, up to 4.36 million yen ($ 54 500)
after the reform in 2007 compared with 2.65 million yen
($ 33 100) before the reform in 2003 [27]. We took this
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could be an incentive to attract residents.
Data collection
We obtained the number of applicants and the quota of
each programme from publicly available data in the
homepage of the JRMP [37]. The JRMP issues the in-
terim and final annual reports. We used the numbers in
the interim report because they better reflected the ori-
ginal preference of medical graduates before adjustment
to the final decision. Because of data availability, we used
data in 2006 and 2009 to obtain as large a sample size as
possible for a balanced panel.
We obtained information on hospital characteristics from
the Guidebook of Residency Programme Hospitals, which
is annually published on the web site by the Foundation for
Promotion of Medical Training [38,39]. This Guidebook
contains information from approximately 800 teaching hos-
pitals, including university hospitals, such as location, hos-
pital size, the annual number of outpatients, inpatients, and
emergency services, the number of medical staff and super-
visor physicians, the contents of training programmes, and
salary and other employment conditions for residents.
In 2006 and 2009, 1049 programmes of 944 non-
university hospitals, and 1051 programmes of 940 non-
university hospitals, respectively, participated in the
JRMP. Among these, 796 programmes from 705 hospi-
tals in 2006 and 793 programmes from 682 hospitals in
2009 provided information for the Guidebook. Because
programmes were renamed, scrapped, or built over time,
we manually examined the programme name, contents,
and the size of the quota to match identical programmes
between the 2 years. Some hospitals provided multiple
programmes, although these programmes likely shared
institution-specific conditions, such as hospital size and
salary. Therefore, we selected one of the largest pro-
grammes per hospital. Otherwise, we used summation
numbers across programmes to obtain the applicant/
quota ratio of the whole institute. We were able to
match 475 pairs of programmes for further analysis.
Population data from the municipalities of hospital lo-
cations were obtained from the national censuses held in
2010 [40].
Study variables
For the target variable we used the ratio of the number of
applicants to the programme quota, according to a previous
study [25], as an aggregated indicator of residents’ choice
preferences.
Our main explanatory variable was the total amount of
the resident’s salary throughout the 2-year residency
programmes, based on Kawamura’s method [25]. Extra al-
lowance for overtime work and night shift work was not
included because it was likely to depend more on theresident’s duties rather than on monetary reward and the
preferences of residents.
For comparative purposes, we adopted a set of covariates
similar to those used in a previous study [25], such as the
number of teaching physicians, hospital beds, emergency
patients, and open/closed programmes within a single insti-
tution. The number of hospital beds should reflect the ex-
tent of hospital capacity and activity, which is further
expected to parallel the volume and variety of inpatients
with which the residents can gain experience during their
training. However, because the number of hospital beds
was under government regulation and was relatively con-
stant over time, we replaced it in panel data analysis with
the number of inpatients, which was more likely to vary
over time. A closed programme within a single institution,
compared with an open programme affiliated with other
hospitals/clinics, was more likely to be provided by an insti-
tution with a wider variation of patients and more affluent
educational resources, including teaching staff.
We further chose not to include several variables used
in the previous study by Kawamura [25], such as the num-
ber of clinical departments and a dummy variable for the
hospital’s location in metropolitan cities, because these
features also do not change over time. Additionally, the
number of departments was not reliable as an indicator of
the size and function of hospitals because of non-stan-
dardized categorization of subspecialties under the current
legal regulation of hospital administration in Japan [41].
Kawamura’s study [25] included the number of months
for training of selective specialties in the programme as an
index of programme attractiveness, but we did not include
this information because it was specific to a programme
rather than to a hospital.
Statistical analysis
Descriptive statistics of hospital characteristics in 2-year pe-
riods were tested with the paired t-test. We conducted an
OLS regression in the first step to replicate the results in
Kawamura’s study as follows:
Y it ¼ Xitβþ μit
where Yit is the number of applicants to the quota of facility
i in year t, Xit is a vector of explanatory variables including
salary, and μit is the error term. We used data from 2009
for this analysis because they were more similar to the data
from 2008 used for Kawamura’s analysis [25].
We further conducted panel data analysis with fixed
and random effect models to eliminate the effect of un-
observed heterogeneity of hospitals as follows:
Y it ¼ Xitβþ Di þ εit
where Di is a vector reflecting time-consistent observed
characteristics and unobserved heterogeneity of hospi-
tals, and εit is the error term.
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affect the impact of income, as well as hospital size and
educational environments, we also performed stratified
analysis by the population size of a city where the hos-
pital was located. We divided hospitals into two groups
by the median (that is, 279,127) of the population size.
We also conducted ad hoc analysis with interaction
terms as described in the Results section. We first
obtained OLS estimation for comparative purposes with
previous studies. We then additionally conducted panel
data analyses with fixed and random effect models to
evaluate misspecification bias. The estimated results are
presented as elasticity for comparison purposes across
the strata and models.
We conducted the F-test, Hausman test, and Breusch-
Pagan test for model specification, or to identify the best
model to address the effect of unobserved heterogeneity
and within-hospital variance [42]. Data were analyzed
with the statistical software STATA 11 (Stata Corpor-
ation, College Station, TX, USA).Results
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample of
hospitals included in the analysis. Over the studied period
of 3 years, the salary of the 2-year residency was increased
by 1.03 million yen ($ 12 875, P <0.001). The number of
hospital beds (P <0.001), that of inpatients (P <0.001), and
the proportion of closed training programmes (P <0.001)
were significantly decreased on average over the same
period. The number of teaching physicians and the average
number of emergency patients were the same over this
period.
Table 2 shows the results of regression models. The
coefficients of variables included in the model were
positive and statistically significant, but not for salary
and the number of emergency patients. A larger number
of teaching physicians, closed training programmes
within a single institution, and a larger number of hos-
pital beds were associated with a larger ratio of appli-
cant number to quota.Table 1 Description of statistical sample
Variable
Ratio of the number of applicants to programme quota
Salary (million yen, per 2 years)
Number of teaching physicians (persons per 100 beds)
Number of hospital beds
Average number of inpatients (persons per day)
Closed programme within a single institution (closed programme=1)
Average number of emergency patients (persons per day per 10 beds)
Number of hospitals = 475.In the fixed effect model, salary showed a significant
positive effect (ε = 0.4995, P = 0.015). The number
of teaching physicians stayed significantly positive
(ε = 0.3678, P = 0.004). The number of inpatients, replaced
with that of hospital beds, also exhibited a positive effect
(ε = 0.9316, P = 0.002) on the ratio of applicant number to
quota. The number of emergency patients was positive
(ε = 0.0309, P = 0.421) and the closed programme was
negative (ε = −0.0096, P = 0.644), but these were not sta-
tistically significant.
In the random effect model, the results were similar to
those of the pooled OLS, and salary was not statistically sig-
nificant. The F-test of the model specification was highly
significant (P <0.0001), in favor of the random effect model
over the pooled OLS regression. The Breusch-Pagan test
was also highly significant (P <0.0001), suggesting that the
fixed model was better than the pooled OLS regression re-
sults. Finally, the Hausman test showed a P-value equal to
0.0001, suggesting that the results of the fixed effect model
are the most relevant to address unobserved heterogeneity
among hospitals.
Because the ratio in a smaller quota programme is more
susceptible to a change in the number of applicants, we also
conducted least squares regression weighted by hospital
size, and first difference estimation with dummy variables
for hospital size, and found significant coefficients of salary
(data not shown).
Table 3 shows the results of analyses stratified by the city
size of the hospital location. The elasticity of the salary in
the OLS (ε = 0.5787, P = 0.027), the fixed effect model
(ε = 0.6498, P = 0.036), and the random effect model
(ε = 0.5470, P = 0.004), was positive and statistically signifi-
cant in the small cities, but not significant in the large cities.
When including an interaction term with the number of
teaching physicians, however, the elasticity of salary became
statistically significant and positive in the fixed effect model
(ε = 1.9089, P = 0.016) and in the random effect model
(ε = 1.7051, P = 0.004) in large cities, and the magnitude of
the elasticity was comparable with that in small cities. The
effect of the number of teaching physicians in the fixed ef-
fect model was positive and statistically significant, and2006 2009 P-value
Mean SD Mean SD
0.71 0.68 0.68 0.59 0.24
9.08 2.00 10.11 2.24 <0.001
10.4 3.1 10.4 3.7 0.92
433 173 424 167 <0.001
375 153 348 148 <0.001
0.27 0.45 0.14 0.34 <0.001
0.92 0.58 0.92 0.96 0.91
Table 2 Multivariate analysis of the ratio of the number of applicants to programme quota by hospital characteristics
Model Ordinary least squares in 2009 Fixed effect Random effect
Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity
Salary (million yen per 2 years) 0.0810 0.4995* 0.1480
Number of teaching physicians (persons per 100 beds) 0.6211** 0.3678** 0.6908**
Closed programme within a single institution (closed programme = 1) 0.0686** −0.0096 0.0302*
Number of hospital beds (100 beds) 0.5154**
Average number of emergency patients (persons per day per 10 beds) 0.0451 0.0309 0.0660*
Average number of inpatients (persons per day) 0.9316** 0.7145**
Number of hospitals = 475.
* P <0.05.
** P <0.01.
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with that in the small cities (ε = 1.6253, P = 0.033). Finally,
the elasticity of the interaction term was negative and statis-
tically significant in the fixed effect model (ε = −1.5223,
P = 0.038) and in the random effect model (ε = −1.7013,
P = 0.003) in large cities. The elasticity of the interaction
term in small cities was also negative and marginally signifi-
cant (ε = −1.4133, P = 0.052 for the fixed effect model;
ε = −0.9690, P = 0.065 for the random effect model).
The results of the F-test, the Breusch-Pagan test, and
the Hausman test in all four models suggested that theTable 3 Elasticity of the stratified analyses by the population
Model
Ordinary least squares Salary
Number of teaching physicians
Closed programme within a single institution
Number of hospital beds
Average number of emergency patients
Interaction (Salary*Number of teaching physicia
Fixed effects model Salary
Number of teaching physicians
Closed programme within a single institution
Number of inpatients
Average number of emergency patients
Interaction (Salary*Number of teaching physicia
Random effects model Salary
Number of teaching physicians
Closed programme within a single institution
Number of inpatients
Average number of emergency patients
Interaction (Salary*Number of teaching physicia
Number of hospitals
* P <0.05.
**P <0.01.results of the fixed effects model were more relevant
than those in the OLS and the random effect model.
Discussion
We examined the effect of salary on residents’ hospital
choices. The results of pooled OLS were similar to those of
Kawamura’s previous results in that the coefficient of salary
was positive and not significant [25]. However, the results
of the fixed effect model were statistically significant, which
were better supported by statistical specification tests. Ba-
sic characteristics of hospitals, such as hospital function,size of the hospital location
Population <279,127 Population ≥279,127
Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity
0.5787* 1.0390 0.0278 1.3582
0.5905** 1.0740 0.5724** 1.9154*
0.1052** 0.1042** 0.0537** 0.0543**
0.5751** 0.5707** 0.3919** 0.3821**
0.1163 0.1182 0.0315 0.0319
ns) −0.5059 −1.3296
0.6498* 1.9185** 0.3842 1.9089*
0.1985 1.6253* 0.4521** 1.9857**
0.0043 0.0056 −0.0152 −0.0114
0.2155 0.1951 1.5433** 1.5960**
0.0303 0.0053 0.0338 0.0370
ns) −1.4133 −1.5223*
0.5470** 1.4538** 0.0083 1.7051**
0.5900** 1.5453** 0.6793** 2.3981**
0.0505* 0.0488* 0.0277 0.0307
0.8792** 0.8692** 0.5482** 0.5413**
0.1226 0.1231 0.0573 0.0585*
ns) −0.9690 −1.7013**
237 237 238 238
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tractiveness of hospitals and the level of income simultan-
eously [30,43]. Therefore, results that control for this
unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous relationship be-
tween hospital characteristics and salary level should more
precisely identify the effect of salary on residents’ choice of
training hospitals.
Previous studies have also indicated that financial in-
centives would affect physicians’ choice of training hos-
pitals or workplace in high-income countries as well as
in middle-low income countries [13-15,27,28]. A system-
atic review on human resource allocation in healthcare
reported that increased wage for trainees may be an ef-
fective strategy to improve supply as well as distribution
of physicians, though the validity of evidence was limited
due to poor study design [15]. With a sophisticated stat-
istical technique and use of panel data, our results have
added a strong support to the statement that monetary
incentive is a significant factor for a physician’s choice of
early career, especially in rural areas.
Our results also showed that the number of teaching
physicians and that of inpatients had a positive effect on
hospital choices. Previous studies also indicated that the
quality of training environments, such as teaching skills of
attending physicians and opportunities to learn clinical
skills, was a significant factor that affected resident’s choice
of specialty and training location, and job satisfaction
[25,27,44,45]. Although the number of teaching physicians
does not necessarily guarantee the quality of teaching, busy
attending physicians were reported to decrease residents’
satisfaction with the quality of attending teaching in the US
national survey of surgical residents [45]. The questionnaire
survey by the MHLW in Japan also reported that in their
choice of training, non-university residents took into con-
sideration hospital factors, such as the number of clinical
cases, to provide a sufficient learning experience (43.3%),
the comprehensiveness of the training curriculum (37.5%),
the number and quality of teaching physicians (29.7%), and
high-tech therapeutic equipment of hospital facilities
(27.3%) [27]. These conditions are expected to provide
young residents with better opportunities to enhance their
clinical skills and wider alternatives for career development.
In the current study in the analysis stratified by city size,
the interaction term was statistically significant and ne-
gative in both groups, which suggested that the effects of
salary and the number of teaching physicians were an-
tagonistic. Therefore, the effect of salary was diminished
when the number of teaching physicians was large. In
addition, the magnitude of elasticity of the interaction and
the number of teaching physicians were larger in large cities
than those in small cities, suggesting that the antagonistic
effect of the number of teaching physicians is larger in the
urban setting. These results suggest that an increase in the
number of teaching physicians may be a more effectivestrategy to attract residents in the urban setting than an in-
crease in salary, while the increase in the number of teach-
ing physicians may be a difficult alternative under the
current shortage of physicians, especially in rural areas [46].
Offering a higher salary for young residents may be more
feasible instead. Some previous studies argued that financial
incentives alone are not sufficient, and that the strategy for
staffing remote rural areas should be multi-facetted and
comprehensive [6,8,13]. Our results rather indicated that
resource could be strategically allocated between monetary
incentives and training environments, according to local
conditions.
Our study has several limitations. First, almost half of the
hospitals included in the national residency programme
were excluded from our sample because of the limitation in
data availability. Because the submission of hospital
information was voluntary, hospitals with a small-scale
programme tended to be excluded from the Guidebook.
We compared all the hospitals included in the Guidebook
(n = 705 in 2006, and 683 in 2009) with those included in
our panel analysis. We found that the number of teaching
physicians in 2006 was smaller in all the hospitals included
in the Guidebook than those included in our panel analysis
(10.11 persons versus 10.40 persons, P = 0.04), and the
number of inpatients was also smaller in 2006 and 2009 (in
2006, 359 versus 375 patients, P = 0.03; in 2009, 332 versus
348 patients, P = 0.02). Otherwise, the characteristics were
comparable between the two datasets. In our study, the de-
scriptive statistics on the number of hospital beds or doc-
tors were similar to those of Kawamura’s study, which had
a cross-sectional and larger sample than that in our study
[25]. However, in 2009 in the university-affiliated hospitals,
the average number of beds was 596, the average number
of outpatients was 977 per day, and the average number of
doctors was 47 per 100 hospital beds [47]; these numbers
were much larger than in our sample. Therefore, we ac-
knowledge that our estimation of the effect of salary in
non-university hospitals may not necessarily hold true in
the university hospitals. We also cannot deny the possibility
that our results may have limited generalizability, and these
should be confirmed with longer-term and larger panel data
from teaching hospitals in the country.
Second, the natural change in residents’ preferences over
the studied period could have affected our results. For ex-
ample, the number of female physicians has been continu-
ously increasing to more than 30% of newly qualified
physicians [48]. Sex is significantly related to a resident’s
choice of a university hospital as a training site [28], and
also with the likelihood of satisfaction with salary [49]. Be-
cause the number of residents by sex was not available, we
could not account for the effect of the resident’s sex in our
analysis. The results of this study should be confirmed with
sex-specific datasets, or more preferably, with microdata of
residents’ preferences.
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Our results show that an increase in salary has a positive
and significant effect on a resident’s choice of training hos-
pital among non-university institutions. The conditions of
monetary reward in a residency programme are a possible
tactic for hospitals to attract residents.
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